WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:12.820 Welcome back to our final session of the day, which is our second keynote presentation 00:00:12.820 --> 00:00:18.480 from Professor Ragnar Lofsted. Ragnar is a professor of risk management at King's College 00:00:18.480 --> 00:00:22.000 London, where he teaches and conducts research into risk communication and risk management. 00:00:22.620 --> 00:00:28.000 He's also the director of the King's Centre for Risk Management. Ragnar's got a very high profile 00:00:28.000 --> 00:00:30.940 in risk management, both nationally and internationally. 00:00:31.520 --> 00:00:33.560 He holds positions at Harvard University, 00:00:34.000 --> 00:00:36.960 Carnegie Mellon University, Gothenburg University as well, 00:00:37.200 --> 00:00:39.920 and he serves as editor or on the editorial board 00:00:39.920 --> 00:00:41.540 for a number of leading risk journals. 00:00:43.180 --> 00:00:46.120 Wagner's received various awards for his contributions to risk analysis, 00:00:46.600 --> 00:00:49.180 including the 2006 Outstanding Service Award 00:00:49.180 --> 00:00:50.940 from the Society for Risk Analysis, 00:00:51.100 --> 00:00:53.160 to which he was elected a fellow in the previous year. 00:00:53.700 --> 00:00:57.160 He was invited to lead the Independent Review of Health and Safety Legislation, 00:00:58.000 --> 00:01:02.160 in 2011 and he produced a report that was very well received. 00:01:02.160 --> 00:01:04.240 So I'm very pleased to welcome you, Ragnar. 00:01:06.540 --> 00:01:08.520 I look forward to hearing about risk communication. 00:01:08.520 --> 00:01:09.660 Ragnar Kowal- Thank you very much. 00:01:09.660 --> 00:01:10.500 Thank you. 00:01:14.980 --> 00:01:16.700 It's a pleasure to be here on this wonderful, 00:01:16.700 --> 00:01:18.720 beautiful day here in Cambridge. 00:01:18.720 --> 00:01:23.280 And before I start to clarify, I'm not an expert on education 00:01:23.280 --> 00:01:24.620 the way you guys are talking about. 00:01:24.620 --> 00:01:27.180 I actually sat in for the last discussion. 00:01:27.180 --> 00:01:27.920 I was hiding up there. 00:01:27.909 --> 00:01:31.769 a little spy, I was thinking, there's no way I can answer these questions. 00:01:31.889 --> 00:01:36.689 So don't ask me any teaching education questions or A-levels or GCSEs, although I can tell you 00:01:36.689 --> 00:01:40.229 my oldest daughter is going through A-levels right now, and it's a rather stressful period 00:01:40.229 --> 00:01:41.729 being a father, I must say. 00:01:42.529 --> 00:01:47.669 So what I'm going to do today is provide a definition of risk perception and communication 00:01:47.669 --> 00:01:53.729 and put it into context with examples, primarily anecdotal examples, as well as also some serious 00:01:53.729 --> 00:01:58.909 ones. And if time permits, and I should warn you, I gave this talk in Bonn last week to 00:01:58.909 --> 00:02:03.769 a bunch of civil preparedness folks, and I only went through five slides. We'll see how 00:02:03.769 --> 00:02:07.269 we go. This is 32 slides here. We don't know what's going to happen. So if time permits, 00:02:07.329 --> 00:02:12.669 we will also describe how we in Europe have moved from an old consensus model to a new, 00:02:12.789 --> 00:02:18.769 more transparent, deliberative model of regulation, summarize some of the teething problems associated 00:02:18.769 --> 00:02:19.789 with this new model, 00:02:20.629 --> 00:02:22.849 describe what may happen with the new model 00:02:22.849 --> 00:02:24.589 of regulation of a five to ten year period, 00:02:25.029 --> 00:02:27.109 and finally offer some possible solutions 00:02:27.109 --> 00:02:28.129 to achieving problems. 00:02:28.529 --> 00:02:30.249 And I promise basically to organizers 00:02:30.249 --> 00:02:32.089 I will offer you some next steps 00:02:32.089 --> 00:02:34.669 because I have my own personal agenda on this, 00:02:35.209 --> 00:02:36.569 having now been actively involved 00:02:36.569 --> 00:02:40.389 in advising this government on risk for my sins, 00:02:40.509 --> 00:02:41.949 for better or for worse, put it that way. 00:02:42.889 --> 00:02:44.009 And this is on the record, 00:02:44.089 --> 00:02:45.649 so be very careful what I need to say here, don't I? 00:02:46.289 --> 00:02:48.629 So basically, risk perception. 00:02:48.769 --> 00:02:51.929 One of the key issues, this whole field started by work 00:02:51.929 --> 00:02:54.429 by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. 00:02:54.429 --> 00:02:55.829 And they discussed the whole issue 00:02:55.819 --> 00:03:00.579 heuristics and biases, so-called mental shortcuts. 00:03:00.579 --> 00:03:06.039 And they identified a number of very key, very important variables. 00:03:06.039 --> 00:03:09.859 One such thing is the so-called anchoring effect. 00:03:09.859 --> 00:03:16.299 The anchoring effect occurs when people consider a particular value for an unknown quantity 00:03:16.299 --> 00:03:18.799 before estimating that quantity. 00:03:18.799 --> 00:03:24.979 What happens then is that estimate stays close to the number the person initially considered. 00:03:24.979 --> 00:03:27.219 Now, let me give you a couple of examples of what I mean by that. 00:03:27.659 --> 00:03:33.799 For example, if you were asked whether Gandhi was more than 114 years of age when he died, 00:03:34.499 --> 00:03:38.359 then you'll end up with a much higher estimate of his age at the time of death 00:03:38.359 --> 00:03:43.759 than you would if you asked a question referencing to his death at age 35, right? 00:03:44.299 --> 00:03:49.459 Similarly, if you look at the work, if you look at, for example, the BP oil spill in 2010. 00:03:49.979 --> 00:03:51.439 Remember when I think the thing happened? 00:03:51.959 --> 00:03:53.639 The initial estimate for BP was what? 00:03:53.639 --> 00:03:56.979 It was 1,000 barrels were leaking out of that thing a day. 00:03:57.919 --> 00:04:01.899 The actual number, as you all know, was 65,000 barrels a day. 00:04:02.379 --> 00:04:07.439 But BP could not, in the wildest mansion, move from 1,000 to 65,000 00:04:07.439 --> 00:04:09.399 because they were anchoring at 1,000. 00:04:09.699 --> 00:04:12.719 So they think it would be 2,000, 3,000, not 65,000. 00:04:13.179 --> 00:04:16.819 And that's one of the problems BP had in its communication strategy. 00:04:17.819 --> 00:04:21.659 Furthermore, I can tell you, you can look at the museums in the States in particular, 00:04:21.659 --> 00:04:23.719 is that a lot of these folks 00:04:23.728 --> 00:04:31.308 aware of folks anchoring. So for example, if you go to the Boston Museum of Fine Art, 00:04:31.988 --> 00:04:37.328 and you go there on one Thursday per month, it's free. If you go in there and you don't 00:04:37.328 --> 00:04:44.288 see the sign, please give a donation. People give maybe $1 or $2. But if it says basically 00:04:44.288 --> 00:04:50.288 it's an anchor, suggested donation, $20, I can assure you it's going to be more than 00:04:50.288 --> 00:04:53.668 one or two dollars, even like 13 or 14 or 15 dollars. 00:04:54.748 --> 00:04:56.968 Anchoring effect is absolutely crucial. 00:04:57.908 --> 00:05:03.488 Another important issue, the simplifying heuristic, people use resemblance to make a difficult 00:05:03.488 --> 00:05:04.048 judgment. 00:05:04.788 --> 00:05:07.588 I'm going to give you now a quote, an example here. 00:05:08.228 --> 00:05:14.228 An individual has been described by his neighbor as follows, and I quote, Steve is a very shy 00:05:14.228 --> 00:05:22.388 and withdrawn. Invariably helpful, but with little interest in people or in the world of reality. 00:05:23.248 --> 00:05:29.328 A meek and tidy soul. He has a need for order and structure and a passion for detail. 00:05:30.288 --> 00:05:37.028 And it's now in the States. Is Steve more likely to be a librarian or a farmer? Hands up for 00:05:37.028 --> 00:05:42.288 librarian. The whole, all of you are going to say librarian, I promise you on that one. 00:05:42.288 --> 00:05:44.908 And this is basically work by Daniel Kahneman. 00:05:44.908 --> 00:05:47.348 And actually fact is, no, the problem here is 00:05:47.348 --> 00:05:51.648 we ignore statistics, there are 20 times more male 00:05:51.638 --> 00:05:53.518 farmers than they are librarians. 00:05:53.978 --> 00:05:55.518 So this guy, he's making tidy 00:05:55.518 --> 00:05:57.518 show and doesn't like people, obviously hangs with cows 00:05:57.518 --> 00:05:59.438 the whole time, he's going to be a farmer. 00:06:00.698 --> 00:06:01.538 It's a very important 00:06:01.538 --> 00:06:03.578 standardifying heuristic. Furthermore, 00:06:03.798 --> 00:06:05.058 it's availability heuristic. 00:06:05.898 --> 00:06:07.578 Our judgments are warped 00:06:07.578 --> 00:06:08.918 by media coverage, 00:06:09.438 --> 00:06:11.278 the so-called availability of 00:06:11.278 --> 00:06:13.458 information. When I ask my 00:06:13.458 --> 00:06:15.518 students at King's College 00:06:15.518 --> 00:06:17.578 or elsewhere, do we have more 00:06:17.578 --> 00:06:19.858 homicides or more suicides 00:06:19.858 --> 00:06:20.878 in the United States? 00:06:21.418 --> 00:06:25.298 The answer I always get is, oh, Ragnar, that's easy. 00:06:25.678 --> 00:06:27.198 It's going to be tons more homicides. 00:06:27.398 --> 00:06:31.618 I mean, every single day on U.S. television, you have like 474 deaths. 00:06:32.158 --> 00:06:34.958 There must be many more murders than suicides. 00:06:35.558 --> 00:06:40.178 But in actual fact, the statistics show there are actually more suicides than homicides. 00:06:41.678 --> 00:06:44.278 Furthermore, we need to understand base rates. 00:06:44.878 --> 00:06:48.318 Large samples are much more accurate than small samples. 00:06:48.458 --> 00:06:50.298 I always talk to posters about this. 00:06:50.298 --> 00:06:53.238 Well basically, these figures look really good. 00:06:53.238 --> 00:06:55.638 What's a sample size of a little 50? 00:06:55.638 --> 00:06:58.038 Well, sample sizes of 50 are not really useful. 00:06:58.038 --> 00:07:01.398 These are more like 1,000, a minimum. 00:07:01.398 --> 00:07:04.678 And furthermore, you have so-called hindsight bias. 00:07:04.678 --> 00:07:06.938 This is, I know it all along in fact, 00:07:06.938 --> 00:07:10.058 people tend to revise their beliefs in light 00:07:10.058 --> 00:07:11.838 of what actually happened. 00:07:11.838 --> 00:07:15.378 So for example, if you speak to folks across the pond 00:07:15.378 --> 00:07:17.758 in New York, for example, now post 9-11, 00:07:17.758 --> 00:07:19.538 they'll say, we totally knew 00:07:19.547 --> 00:07:23.067 going to happen. People are going to go and take these airplanes, use them as rockets and fly into 00:07:23.387 --> 00:07:29.147 various skyscrapers in New York. Well, in actual fact, no way. If you speak to the FBI or the CIA 00:07:29.147 --> 00:07:34.267 or these very military people, which I do from time to time, they will tell you we had simply 00:07:34.267 --> 00:07:40.827 no idea. We were not ready for it. Another example of hindsight bias was the Japanese bombing of 00:07:40.827 --> 00:07:45.307 Pearl Harbor. If you speak to a lot of folks and conspiracy theorists, well, basically, 00:07:45.307 --> 00:07:47.167 Roosevelt wanted to go into the war. 00:07:47.407 --> 00:07:48.667 He wanted this to happen. 00:07:49.047 --> 00:07:50.047 He knew all about it. 00:07:50.127 --> 00:07:54.167 No, Roosevelt did not know anything about the bombing of Pearl Harbor. 00:07:54.547 --> 00:07:56.067 So-called hindsight bias. 00:07:56.527 --> 00:07:59.747 And by the way, if you want the complete references, please see me after class. 00:08:00.007 --> 00:08:00.567 After this. 00:08:03.447 --> 00:08:05.767 Basically, it's a career damage move. 00:08:06.067 --> 00:08:07.567 After this session. 00:08:08.427 --> 00:08:13.427 What I can say, however, is if you find this stuff interesting, 00:08:13.427 --> 00:08:23.907 please go out and buy and read Daniel Kahneman's book from November 2011 called Thinking Fast and Slow. 00:08:24.387 --> 00:08:27.407 It's called Thinking Fast and Slow. 00:08:27.887 --> 00:08:30.427 It is absolutely, completely brilliant. 00:08:31.247 --> 00:08:35.427 Kahneman, by the way, won a Nobel Prize in behavioral economics in 2004, I believe. 00:08:36.047 --> 00:08:39.387 And it's a great book, and you can read it over dinner, over evening time, even a weekend. 00:08:39.547 --> 00:08:40.407 I did it. It was brilliant. 00:08:40.407 --> 00:08:45.907 Furthermore, the work of Kahneman and Tversky influenced other people, people like Baruch 00:08:45.907 --> 00:08:47.467 Fischoff at Carnegie Mellon. 00:08:47.456 --> 00:08:49.516 One of my mentors, Paul Slobic in Oregon, 00:08:49.716 --> 00:08:51.456 and Sarah Lichtenstein, also based in Oregon. 00:08:52.016 --> 00:08:55.256 And what they found out here is that people view risks differently. 00:08:56.516 --> 00:09:01.176 One key factor is the whole issue of natural vis-a-vis technological. 00:09:02.356 --> 00:09:04.636 Natural hazards are seen to be what? 00:09:04.636 --> 00:09:07.636 They're seen to be acts of God. 00:09:08.316 --> 00:09:09.796 There is no one to blame. 00:09:10.636 --> 00:09:14.316 Technological hazards are seen to be acts of humans. 00:09:14.776 --> 00:09:16.216 There are someone to blame. 00:09:17.116 --> 00:09:19.776 When I was doing my PhD on the east coast of the United States, 00:09:19.956 --> 00:09:22.636 I should clarify, I'm very Swedish, as you can see from my name, 00:09:22.996 --> 00:09:24.476 but I spent a lot of time in the States. 00:09:24.576 --> 00:09:26.056 You can probably hear from my accent, actually, can't you? 00:09:26.136 --> 00:09:26.936 I think you probably can. 00:09:27.576 --> 00:09:29.776 And I was doing my PhD on the east coast side of the United States. 00:09:30.136 --> 00:09:32.676 A lot of my undergraduate students decided to basically, you know, 00:09:32.696 --> 00:09:35.196 to ditch class and say, you know, Ragnar, 00:09:35.316 --> 00:09:36.836 we're going to go away for a few days. 00:09:36.956 --> 00:09:37.716 I said, why? 00:09:38.156 --> 00:09:40.096 Oh, Ragnar, it's hurricane season, you know? 00:09:40.576 --> 00:09:41.536 Hurricanes are really cool. 00:09:42.136 --> 00:09:42.696 So what are you going to do? 00:09:42.696 --> 00:09:44.156 Oh, we're going to go down to the Florida Keys, 00:09:44.156 --> 00:09:47.236 and then we're going to basically rent a couple of flats on the Florida Keys 00:09:47.236 --> 00:09:49.876 and we're going to buy a few bottles of rum and we're going to do what? 00:09:49.996 --> 00:09:50.936 We're going to party the hurricane. 00:09:51.516 --> 00:09:53.216 And they had a great time partying the hurricane. 00:09:53.376 --> 00:09:56.636 They came back and described to me in great detail how drunk they were partying this hurricane. 00:09:57.496 --> 00:10:01.816 What do you think happened when we had the Three Mile Island accident 00:10:01.816 --> 00:10:04.616 in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 1979 00:10:04.616 --> 00:10:06.476 when a local radio station said, 00:10:06.776 --> 00:10:10.096 we've had a minor incident here at Three Mile Island. 00:10:10.096 --> 00:10:15.356 We suggest that all women pregnant women within a radius of say 15 miles 00:10:15.366 --> 00:10:18.466 should evacuate now for safety precautions. 00:10:19.026 --> 00:10:19.966 What do you think happened? 00:10:21.446 --> 00:10:22.186 Obvious, right? 00:10:22.326 --> 00:10:23.426 They all evacuated. 00:10:23.946 --> 00:10:25.226 Everybody evacuated. 00:10:25.446 --> 00:10:27.226 So nobody evacuated because we couldn't move 00:10:27.226 --> 00:10:29.666 because the roads were gridlocked. 00:10:30.306 --> 00:10:32.006 Did anybody stay behind and say, 00:10:32.066 --> 00:10:34.326 you know what, let's go party three-mile island? 00:10:34.966 --> 00:10:36.186 No, of course not. 00:10:37.446 --> 00:10:42.686 So some people actively go out and seek natural hazards, 00:10:42.686 --> 00:10:46.526 that people will not go out and seek technological hazards. 00:10:46.666 --> 00:10:47.306 A big difference. 00:10:48.686 --> 00:10:49.666 Is this interesting, by the way? 00:10:50.426 --> 00:10:51.066 Enjoying this? 00:10:51.166 --> 00:10:51.646 Oh, phew. 00:10:51.966 --> 00:10:52.966 Thank you for inviting me. 00:10:53.046 --> 00:10:53.566 I was getting... 00:10:53.566 --> 00:10:56.146 We need to be sure about these things. 00:10:56.206 --> 00:10:57.746 We discussed Swedish forestry history at the time. 00:10:57.746 --> 00:10:57.966 I don't know. 00:11:01.166 --> 00:11:05.626 Another important issue is how you show voluntary vis-à-vis involuntary risk. 00:11:05.626 --> 00:11:09.786 work by a man named Chauncey Starr showed in 1969 00:11:09.786 --> 00:11:16.426 that people are 1,000 times more worried about involuntary risks 00:11:16.426 --> 00:11:18.306 than they are about voluntary ones. 00:11:19.006 --> 00:11:22.226 What happens here is many people like taking voluntary risks. 00:11:22.486 --> 00:11:23.466 How many of you are skiers? 00:11:25.586 --> 00:11:26.966 And what do you guys go skiing for? 00:11:27.286 --> 00:11:28.386 Because it's fun, right? 00:11:28.386 --> 00:11:30.326 You like the risk element. 00:11:30.466 --> 00:11:34.246 It's like being outdoors, seeing the snow, beautiful people, beautiful sights. 00:11:34.446 --> 00:11:34.566 Right? 00:11:34.566 --> 00:11:36.066 In a nutshell, more or less. 00:11:37.166 --> 00:11:39.386 But do you worry about the risks of skiing? 00:11:40.306 --> 00:11:42.806 Oh, some other person up here says, kind of, yes. 00:11:43.275 --> 00:11:48.215 So what do you think is the risk of skiing if you're skiing in Zaramad, Switzerland, 00:11:48.755 --> 00:11:52.015 you are non-Swiss, and you ski less than 10 days a year? 00:11:52.415 --> 00:11:53.915 Can we have a guess of percentages? 00:11:55.155 --> 00:11:57.875 Zero, one, two, three, four, five, ten, fifty, a hundred. 00:11:58.775 --> 00:11:59.255 Any guesses? 00:12:00.275 --> 00:12:01.755 I'm not grading you, by the way. 00:12:03.255 --> 00:12:03.655 Ten. 00:12:04.355 --> 00:12:05.755 Ten, we have ten up front. 00:12:05.895 --> 00:12:06.435 Higher or lower? 00:12:08.075 --> 00:12:08.475 Higher. 00:12:08.795 --> 00:12:09.535 Somebody says lower. 00:12:10.255 --> 00:12:10.755 Okay, fair enough. 00:12:10.755 --> 00:12:14.295 The reason why I ask you this is because now you can hear an anecdotal story. 00:12:14.655 --> 00:12:15.735 I was very much skiing. 00:12:16.095 --> 00:12:20.015 I had done a very simply blue run in Zermatt, Switzerland back in 2005. 00:12:20.975 --> 00:12:23.395 And lo and behold, my binding released. 00:12:23.595 --> 00:12:24.235 Not a good thing. 00:12:24.835 --> 00:12:25.915 Involuntarily binding released. 00:12:26.315 --> 00:12:30.555 I flew up in there, and I landed basically 100 kilos in my right leg. 00:12:30.835 --> 00:12:32.355 I broke my leg in four places. 00:12:32.535 --> 00:12:33.695 Something you don't want to do. 00:12:34.055 --> 00:12:36.355 I'm never going to go through childbirth, my friends, but you know what? 00:12:36.395 --> 00:12:39.035 I think I probably did that with breaking my leg in four places. 00:12:39.415 --> 00:12:40.135 I did scream. 00:12:40.135 --> 00:12:41.195 It was very, very painful. 00:12:41.815 --> 00:12:44.695 Anyways, after I broke my leg and realized that's it, 00:12:44.755 --> 00:12:46.355 my skiing holiday is over on day three, 00:12:46.775 --> 00:12:48.995 I was taken down an ambulance to the local hospital 00:12:48.995 --> 00:12:52.415 in a place called Visp where they very kindly operated me on. 00:12:52.835 --> 00:12:55.655 I didn't have my laptop or my BlackBerry with me, 00:12:55.715 --> 00:12:56.695 so I was kind of stuck. 00:12:56.835 --> 00:12:58.875 And I don't really like watching television that much. 00:12:59.295 --> 00:13:00.935 I like to think, you know. 00:13:01.475 --> 00:13:03.255 So I decided to figure out, you know, 00:13:03.335 --> 00:13:06.215 how many folks are in this hospital this week? 00:13:06.555 --> 00:13:08.715 How many of them basically have broken bones? 00:13:09.095 --> 00:13:09.815 Where are they from? 00:13:10.135 --> 00:13:11.195 How many people? 00:13:11.184 --> 00:13:12.984 actually are based in Zaramad skiing this week. 00:13:13.064 --> 00:13:15.524 So did a minor, you know, back-in-envelope calculation. 00:13:16.184 --> 00:13:21.724 And we found out basically every single person in that hospital that week were, hello, non-Swiss. 00:13:21.924 --> 00:13:23.564 They were all basically flatlanders. 00:13:23.804 --> 00:13:24.464 They were Dutch. 00:13:24.684 --> 00:13:25.424 They were Danes. 00:13:25.604 --> 00:13:26.304 They were Brits. 00:13:26.304 --> 00:13:31.384 They were Irish and occasional, you know, token southern Swedish guy like myself tossed in there. 00:13:31.724 --> 00:13:36.664 We were basically a complete sausage factory of being going into operation room and coming back out again. 00:13:36.664 --> 00:13:40.344 And we calculated basically that the risk of breaking a leg there, 00:13:40.864 --> 00:13:46.744 breaking a bone, not just a leg, a bone, fingers included, was 2.4%. 00:13:46.744 --> 00:13:51.284 Now, don't quote Lofton on this because it's anecdotal back-of-the-envelope calculation. 00:13:51.764 --> 00:13:55.944 But since I'm 48 now, it's basically in my mid-40s then, I'd skied half my life. 00:13:56.244 --> 00:13:59.864 If you do an ad hoc risk analysis, which by the way you should never do, 00:13:59.984 --> 00:14:05.364 but you can do it anyways, so 22 years times 2.4% is around 50%. 00:14:05.724 --> 00:14:07.924 I was waiting to break my leg, wasn't I? 00:14:08.644 --> 00:14:09.504 That's what happened. 00:14:10.504 --> 00:14:12.084 And now you're going to ask me, where do you go skiing again? 00:14:12.184 --> 00:14:13.824 Well, I have been once or twice, but you know what? 00:14:13.864 --> 00:14:15.044 It's not the same thing anymore. 00:14:15.084 --> 00:14:17.844 Once you break a leg, you kind of lose enjoyment of it. 00:14:18.624 --> 00:14:21.424 What's happening here is that when we take voluntary risk, 00:14:21.424 --> 00:14:27.264 we make our own independent personal benefit-risk calculation. 00:14:27.404 --> 00:14:32.984 We think, basically, for me personally, the risks of skiing, basically, are small, 00:14:33.104 --> 00:14:34.284 and the benefits are great. 00:14:34.284 --> 00:14:37.044 Therefore, I'll continue to go skiing. 00:14:37.044 --> 00:14:39.104 The same thing for example, classic 00:14:39.094 --> 00:14:44.314 example is the whole issue of mobile telephones. A lot of people have small worries of mobile 00:14:44.314 --> 00:14:48.574 telephones, but all of you still have a mobile telephone or a smartphone or something because 00:14:48.574 --> 00:14:54.554 you think the benefits outweigh the risks. Furthermore, in that same area of mobile telephony, 00:14:55.114 --> 00:15:01.794 people worry a lot about mobile telephone base stations. People hate these base stations. They 00:15:01.794 --> 00:15:04.974 think they're worried about the value of the home going down, but they also worry about this, you 00:15:04.974 --> 00:15:08.814 know, radiation from this base station going in and creeping into the bedroom and nuking their kids, 00:15:08.814 --> 00:15:15.054 But in actual fact, the radiation from these base stations are much less than they are in your phone. 00:15:15.554 --> 00:15:20.054 But your phone, hello, is a voluntary risk, and that base station is certainly not voluntary. 00:15:20.394 --> 00:15:22.174 It's highly involuntary. 00:15:23.554 --> 00:15:28.654 Another important factor is the whole issue of familiar vis-à-vis non-familiar risk. 00:15:28.734 --> 00:15:29.374 Is this pace okay? 00:15:29.874 --> 00:15:30.734 Is this pace good? 00:15:31.134 --> 00:15:32.134 Let me know if I go too fast. 00:15:32.194 --> 00:15:32.754 You'll stop me. 00:15:33.174 --> 00:15:33.874 Yes, you'll tell me. 00:15:33.894 --> 00:15:35.094 Ragnar, you're speaking too fast. 00:15:35.654 --> 00:15:37.734 Familiar vis-à-vis non-familiar risk. 00:15:37.734 --> 00:15:43.734 People are afraid of the unknown, horrified of the unknown. 00:15:43.734 --> 00:15:45.734 Familiar risk, we accept much more. 00:15:45.734 --> 00:15:51.734 If you look, for example, back at the various flu outbreaks we've had in this country and 00:15:51.734 --> 00:15:55.734 elsewhere in Europe and North America, and look how basically these flu outbreaks have 00:15:55.734 --> 00:15:58.734 been seriously hyped and discussed. 00:15:58.734 --> 00:15:59.734 People are horrified. 00:15:59.734 --> 00:16:04.734 People are, you speak to the medical authorities in this country, they are worried about one 00:16:04.734 --> 00:16:07.014 issue, the repeat of the speech. 00:16:07.003 --> 00:16:08.083 Spanish flu. 00:16:08.623 --> 00:16:10.843 And the reason what happened to Spanish flu, as you all know, 00:16:10.903 --> 00:16:13.143 because you've been teaching this topic everywhere, 00:16:13.563 --> 00:16:17.903 is basically it affected younger kids, younger people, more than old ones. 00:16:18.083 --> 00:16:21.023 Every single year, you have ordinary flu, and a few people die. 00:16:21.103 --> 00:16:22.123 Most of them are old people. 00:16:22.323 --> 00:16:23.583 Old people are supposed to die. 00:16:23.823 --> 00:16:25.183 Young people are not supposed to die. 00:16:25.663 --> 00:16:27.703 And that's what people worry about, with the whole issue of Spanish flu. 00:16:28.403 --> 00:16:31.183 Do you think the whole issue of these flus have been well handled? 00:16:31.663 --> 00:16:34.303 Have they been well handled by the various regulators? 00:16:34.303 --> 00:16:42.743 I would say basically overall, and I should clarify, it comes of interest, I have basically advised regulators in this country, in Brussels, Sweden, and elsewhere. 00:16:43.263 --> 00:16:46.283 I find many cases that have actually been pretty badly handled. 00:16:46.663 --> 00:16:49.263 They have frightened people in many ways unnecessarily. 00:16:49.563 --> 00:16:51.303 I'm going to give you one example. 00:16:52.183 --> 00:16:59.623 During the bird flu outbreak we had a few years ago, I had been spending the day advising of friends at DG Sanko. 00:16:59.683 --> 00:17:03.383 I should clarify, I travel every week, even talk somewhere in Europe and North America, more or less every week. 00:17:03.783 --> 00:17:06.003 I was in Brussels talking to the consumer affairs folks 00:17:06.003 --> 00:17:08.563 about bird flu and communicating bird flu. 00:17:09.203 --> 00:17:10.343 I came home that evening. 00:17:10.463 --> 00:17:10.903 I'm married. 00:17:11.223 --> 00:17:13.343 I have two daughters who live by the tennis courts in Wimbledon. 00:17:14.103 --> 00:17:16.023 And my oldest daughter was crying in bed, 00:17:16.063 --> 00:17:18.443 and my wife said, you know, Ragnar, go upstairs and see what's going on. 00:17:19.223 --> 00:17:22.823 So I dashed upstairs, and there she is wailing her eyes out. 00:17:23.063 --> 00:17:27.063 And she says, Papa, I'm worried about dying, she says. 00:17:27.503 --> 00:17:28.083 I said, oh, no. 00:17:28.483 --> 00:17:30.323 It's starting earlier and earlier and earlier. 00:17:30.503 --> 00:17:31.463 I mean, it's ridiculous. 00:17:31.463 --> 00:17:34.923 And I said, so sweetheart, why are you worried about 00:17:34.913 --> 00:17:41.933 dying. I said, well, I'm worried about dying for bird flu, she says. So why are you worried about 00:17:41.933 --> 00:17:47.393 dying from bird flu, sweetheart? What's going on? Papa, I have a bird turd on my window, she says, 00:17:47.393 --> 00:17:53.713 and she points at the window up top, the top floor of the house. And I said, you know, sweetheart, 00:17:53.893 --> 00:17:58.133 and I picked in a country, no offense on the country, I picked, I'll say somewhere in Southeast 00:17:58.133 --> 00:18:04.413 Asia, I'll say Vietnam for argument's sake. So I said, basically, sweetheart, you have nothing to 00:18:04.413 --> 00:18:09.733 worry about. If you were basically living in Vietnam and you were sleeping here with 3,000 00:18:09.733 --> 00:18:15.533 ducks for a period of six months, you maybe get bird flu. But you won't get bird flu here 00:18:15.533 --> 00:18:21.333 in SW19 in Wimbledon. And she said, and you know how girls are, she was just look at, 00:18:21.393 --> 00:18:25.933 you know, all kids are, they look at you and they point and say, Papa, are you sure? And 00:18:25.933 --> 00:18:34.373 I say, and I say, sweetheart, I'm a risk professor. I am positive. And so what happened, 00:18:34.413 --> 00:18:38.113 You guys like that one, that's good. 00:18:38.113 --> 00:18:41.893 So what happens is, what on earth is going on here? 00:18:41.893 --> 00:18:44.073 My daughter is freaking out over bird flu, 00:18:44.073 --> 00:18:45.693 so I need to know what's going on. 00:18:45.693 --> 00:18:47.333 So I go downstairs and I inquire, 00:18:47.333 --> 00:18:50.413 and it turns out that the children's BBC program, 00:18:50.413 --> 00:18:52.493 they had the news thing, and basically, 00:18:52.493 --> 00:18:54.013 if I'm not gonna mention anybody's name, 00:18:54.013 --> 00:18:55.293 we always call them Fruitcake, 00:18:55.293 --> 00:18:57.333 said something basically on television, 00:18:57.333 --> 00:18:59.873 not a question of if, but when, 00:18:59.873 --> 00:19:02.833 we'll have a certain number, I believe it was 50,000 people, 00:19:02.822 --> 00:19:04.702 dead from bird flu. Remember that? 00:19:04.822 --> 00:19:06.062 People remember that, right? 00:19:06.442 --> 00:19:08.742 I said, wow, that's a pretty 00:19:08.742 --> 00:19:10.742 big number. Where's this coming from? 00:19:10.862 --> 00:19:12.682 So I decided, firstly, to make a few 00:19:12.682 --> 00:19:14.922 phone calls. So I called the local GPs 00:19:14.922 --> 00:19:16.902 in my area, NSW18, 00:19:17.362 --> 00:19:18.582 and asked them, has anybody 00:19:18.582 --> 00:19:20.722 called to you? I introduced who I am. I'm a professor 00:19:20.722 --> 00:19:22.922 of risk communication and risk management at King's College. 00:19:23.382 --> 00:19:24.462 Has anybody called about 00:19:24.462 --> 00:19:26.322 bird flu? And they said, oh, 00:19:26.442 --> 00:19:28.822 it's been horrible. It's been inundating. 00:19:28.822 --> 00:19:30.662 Every single minute of the day, 00:19:31.002 --> 00:19:32.502 people are calling us bird flu. 00:19:32.502 --> 00:19:55.462 So who's calling? Old age pensioners. Old age pensioners. So, oh, what are they saying? Oh, they're saying three things, professor. They're saying basically, can I have Tamiflu? That's this, you know, anti, whatever it is, anti-flu thing you get from some company. B basically can have vaccination against bird flu. And then C, you guessed it, I have bird flu. 00:19:56.202 --> 00:19:56.762 So there you go. 00:19:57.882 --> 00:20:00.762 At this note, I realize something is pretty seriously going on here, 00:20:00.842 --> 00:20:03.162 so I make a phone call to the UK government 00:20:03.162 --> 00:20:06.102 and demand to speak to Sir Howell James. 00:20:06.402 --> 00:20:07.922 Sir Howell James, at the time, 00:20:08.322 --> 00:20:11.262 was the head of communication for the UK government 00:20:11.262 --> 00:20:12.602 based in the cabinet office. 00:20:13.042 --> 00:20:14.962 So I insist on seeing you. 00:20:14.962 --> 00:20:16.322 I said, I used all my titles 00:20:16.322 --> 00:20:18.502 and dropped every single name I possibly could on the planet, 00:20:18.902 --> 00:20:21.322 and so you need to see me because this is just horrible. 00:20:22.142 --> 00:20:24.842 And for some bizarre reason, he does see me on the same day. 00:20:24.842 --> 00:20:28.602 So I go in, and you know how it is when you're a parent and you're on a mission here because 00:20:28.602 --> 00:20:30.742 your daughter's been upset about something? 00:20:30.731 --> 00:20:32.411 Even when I'm going to clear this mess up. 00:20:33.191 --> 00:20:36.611 So basically, so I go there. 00:20:36.691 --> 00:20:39.151 I go in there, and I say basically, 00:20:39.571 --> 00:20:41.291 and you know how it is when you go into the interview room, 00:20:41.611 --> 00:20:43.891 and you have this very negative body language, right? 00:20:43.931 --> 00:20:45.471 And these people, like, you know, crossing their arms, 00:20:45.531 --> 00:20:46.851 and they're staring at you, and it's like, you know, 00:20:47.071 --> 00:20:48.191 think you're riffraff, and you say, 00:20:48.351 --> 00:20:50.291 just go over there and just sit down there kind of thing. 00:20:50.331 --> 00:20:50.791 That's like me. 00:20:50.791 --> 00:20:54.251 So I sat down there with my little trusty rucksack. 00:20:55.071 --> 00:20:58.031 And they said basically, so, professor, 00:20:58.451 --> 00:21:01.131 Do you have a problem with our bird flu strategy? 00:21:01.271 --> 00:21:02.311 He said, yes. 00:21:02.531 --> 00:21:05.571 I have a very big problem with bird communication strategy. 00:21:05.971 --> 00:21:08.391 He said, are you completely insane, I say? 00:21:08.691 --> 00:21:11.851 Why on earth are you preaching 50,000 people dead? 00:21:11.851 --> 00:21:14.971 You said 50,000 people dead. 00:21:15.511 --> 00:21:19.171 You have absolutely zero evidence for that, I say. 00:21:19.571 --> 00:21:23.011 What you should have said, and the public of this country are not stupid, 00:21:23.191 --> 00:21:25.791 and they deserve better than you being frightening the daylight side of them, 00:21:25.791 --> 00:21:29.211 But you should have said, we don't know how many people die of bird flu. 00:21:29.471 --> 00:21:30.631 We simply don't know. 00:21:31.111 --> 00:21:34.951 It could be zero people, or based on WHO extrapolations, 00:21:35.051 --> 00:21:37.011 it could be three-quarters of a million people. 00:21:37.191 --> 00:21:39.011 We simply don't know. 00:21:39.371 --> 00:21:41.031 And then I told Sir Howard, you said after that, 00:21:41.371 --> 00:21:47.331 is we'll now assemble an expert panel of people who are working in an area of flu epidemics, 00:21:47.771 --> 00:21:51.831 and they will be meeting once a week, and to have more clarity. 00:21:51.831 --> 00:21:58.651 And then we'll communicate to you what we think the risks are dying of bird flu by saying, 00:21:58.641 --> 00:22:02.901 Putting this number out of the air, you know, from these WHO estimates, 50,000 people dead. 00:22:03.341 --> 00:22:09.761 You're doing the publics of this country a disservice, and you're frighteningly unnecessarily based on no evidence. 00:22:10.201 --> 00:22:16.361 I said, the publics deserve better, and if you give them basically, tell them we have scientific uncertainty now, 00:22:16.841 --> 00:22:20.841 and we'll have scientific certainty at some stage, the publics will buy into that. 00:22:21.521 --> 00:22:25.021 And they said to me, wow, are you sure, professor? 00:22:25.021 --> 00:22:27.501 says, I've been acting in this field since Chernobyl accident in 1986. 00:22:27.941 --> 00:22:29.561 I know more about communication than you do. 00:22:29.701 --> 00:22:30.821 Just implement what I have to say. 00:22:30.881 --> 00:22:31.721 And I just walk out the door. 00:22:32.401 --> 00:22:35.801 And I was just, you know, stupid question, fruitcake, you know. 00:22:36.101 --> 00:22:38.401 So anyways, that fruitcake was not on television anymore. 00:22:38.501 --> 00:22:39.741 It didn't frighten the public anymore. 00:22:40.121 --> 00:22:41.181 And that was the end of the story. 00:22:41.481 --> 00:22:44.601 How many people died of bird flu in the UK? 00:22:44.801 --> 00:22:45.201 Does anybody know? 00:22:46.161 --> 00:22:46.521 Zero. 00:22:46.961 --> 00:22:47.821 Not one. 00:22:48.201 --> 00:22:51.041 It killed a few turkeys, mind you, up here in Norfolk somewhere. 00:22:51.381 --> 00:22:52.581 But it didn't kill any birds. 00:22:52.661 --> 00:22:54.341 It didn't kill any people, I can assure you. 00:22:54.341 --> 00:22:55.621 So it's really important. 00:22:55.721 --> 00:22:57.961 We can communicate scientific uncertainty. 00:22:58.541 --> 00:23:00.821 And I think what I don't like when I go into meetings, 00:23:00.961 --> 00:23:01.981 I'm not going to miss this on the record, 00:23:02.061 --> 00:23:03.161 I won't say anything more than that, 00:23:03.481 --> 00:23:05.261 but I go into meetings and individuals say, 00:23:05.641 --> 00:23:06.961 oh, the publics are stupid. 00:23:07.281 --> 00:23:09.281 The publics are not stupid. 00:23:09.621 --> 00:23:12.341 They're basically being informed by sometimes 00:23:12.341 --> 00:23:14.381 a bad communication environment, 00:23:14.661 --> 00:23:17.361 sometimes by people in government themselves, 00:23:17.561 --> 00:23:19.221 but also sometimes by the media, 00:23:19.461 --> 00:23:22.361 in particular Daily Mail, who I simply cannot stand. 00:23:22.361 --> 00:23:26.561 It's nice being an academic. 00:23:26.550 --> 00:23:28.670 saying anything I want to. I love being academic. 00:23:28.790 --> 00:23:29.590 There's a lot of freedom here. 00:23:30.810 --> 00:23:32.690 So very important familiar 00:23:32.690 --> 00:23:34.190 vis-a-vis non-familiar risk. 00:23:35.010 --> 00:23:36.690 Another important factor is the whole 00:23:36.690 --> 00:23:38.630 issue of control vis-a-vis 00:23:38.630 --> 00:23:39.550 non-control. 00:23:40.370 --> 00:23:42.530 We want to be in control 00:23:42.530 --> 00:23:44.170 at all times. 00:23:44.810 --> 00:23:46.630 That's one reason why, for example, 00:23:47.090 --> 00:23:48.210 we are more terrified 00:23:48.210 --> 00:23:50.650 of flying than 00:23:50.650 --> 00:23:52.570 driving. Why? Because when you're 00:23:52.570 --> 00:23:54.790 driving, you have control of the car 00:23:54.790 --> 00:24:01.170 And when you're flying, you're giving that control to a pilot, a pilot you have never even met before. 00:24:02.350 --> 00:24:04.150 How many of you think you're good drivers? 00:24:04.450 --> 00:24:04.870 Hands up. 00:24:07.710 --> 00:24:08.670 It's getting better. 00:24:09.370 --> 00:24:15.270 74% of you, according to research professor Ula Svensson at Stockholm University, think you're good drivers. 00:24:15.750 --> 00:24:17.610 It's basically the fruitcake in front of you is going too slow. 00:24:17.670 --> 00:24:18.750 That's why you bumped into them. 00:24:18.750 --> 00:24:23.910 And what happens is basically also when you're driving with your loved one, 00:24:24.910 --> 00:24:28.810 sometimes, not always, sometimes you have a quarrel because you want to drive the car. 00:24:29.190 --> 00:24:31.810 And when you don't drive the car, you become a backseat driver. 00:24:32.150 --> 00:24:34.250 You say you're going too fast, you're going too slow. 00:24:34.750 --> 00:24:37.390 Why are you brake now? Indicate stop. 00:24:37.810 --> 00:24:43.550 Because you want to drive that car because you trust yourself more in driving that car 00:24:43.550 --> 00:24:46.370 than you trust your loved one in driving that car. 00:24:46.370 --> 00:24:49.870 Control is very important. 00:24:49.870 --> 00:24:54.470 Further factor is the whole issue of high frequency, low 00:24:54.459 --> 00:25:02.620 consequence risk vis-a-vis low frequency, high consequence risk. People worry much more about 00:25:02.620 --> 00:25:10.499 low frequency, high consequence risk. We worry about kill sizes. So, I mean, a classic example 00:25:10.499 --> 00:25:16.799 here is comparing airplane accidents with car accidents. Car accidents, in my view, are a high 00:25:16.799 --> 00:25:22.199 frequency, low consequence risk. Usually it's one, two, three, four, five people dying rather than 200 00:25:22.199 --> 00:25:26.699 people dying, unless you have a massive car, you know, pile up, it had last November, it had fireworks 00:25:26.699 --> 00:25:32.939 down in Devon somewhere. And what happens is basically these types of risks, the high frequency, 00:25:33.059 --> 00:25:39.739 low consequence ones, are not communicated by the media. Therefore, if you go home tonight, 00:25:39.739 --> 00:25:43.340 from here, from Cambridge, in a car, and you basically get killed in a car accident, 00:25:43.679 --> 00:25:47.459 my friends, you will not make the media tomorrow morning. Unless you're a Prince of Diana, 00:25:47.459 --> 00:25:48.840 I should make the media, but not you. 00:25:49.659 --> 00:25:52.019 However, a low-frequency, high-consequence risk 00:25:52.019 --> 00:25:54.999 is something that the media likes reporting about, 00:25:55.219 --> 00:25:56.299 the kill size factor. 00:25:56.579 --> 00:25:59.360 And what happens is if you have an accident here at Heathrow tonight 00:25:59.360 --> 00:26:01.659 when you're flying back to Dublin or wherever you're going to fly back to, 00:26:02.079 --> 00:26:05.239 and the plane explodes and you have 400 people dead, 00:26:05.620 --> 00:26:06.360 what's going to happen? 00:26:06.439 --> 00:26:08.360 I can guarantee you, positive, 00:26:08.620 --> 00:26:11.539 that'll be the first thing on BBC News tonight at 10 o'clock. 00:26:11.999 --> 00:26:13.079 Anybody think that's against me? 00:26:13.759 --> 00:26:15.399 No, I'm absolutely positive. 00:26:15.399 --> 00:26:18.479 It will be also the main thing in the broadsheets tomorrow morning. 00:26:18.479 --> 00:26:22.380 The first four pages, there will be pictures of this plane blowing up, you know, body parts 00:26:22.369 --> 00:26:28.749 through and everywhere. Okay? That's day one. Day two, basically, out of those 400 people dead, 00:26:29.209 --> 00:26:33.749 how many Brits were among those four people dead? Okay? We're in the UK. We don't care about us 00:26:33.749 --> 00:26:39.789 Swedes, right? We're completely insignificant in this category. Or the Americans or Germans or 00:26:39.789 --> 00:26:45.449 something. We care about Brits. Okay? So they say basically it's 200 Brits dead. Day four, 00:26:46.049 --> 00:26:50.189 then they care about basically the women and the kids. Us middle-aged men were basically dead 00:26:50.189 --> 00:26:54.689 anyways. So basically, how many basically were kids and women? Oh, basically, there were 50 00:26:54.689 --> 00:27:01.669 girls and basically 120 women or something like that. And then finally, day seven, cause of 00:27:01.669 --> 00:27:08.789 accident, too much fine wine, but basically, he threw duty-free. That's basically how media reports 00:27:08.789 --> 00:27:14.169 airplane accidents. And the result, that people are so much more worried about airplanes than 00:27:14.169 --> 00:27:15.309 are about cars. 00:27:15.749 --> 00:27:18.429 I gave a talk at a federal evasion authority 00:27:18.429 --> 00:27:21.229 in Washington, D.C. a few months ago, 00:27:21.909 --> 00:27:23.789 and I was giving a version of this talk, 00:27:23.869 --> 00:27:26.269 and I was asking the FAA, basically, 00:27:26.449 --> 00:27:29.989 what do you think would happen if... 00:27:29.989 --> 00:27:30.829 But before I say that, 00:27:30.909 --> 00:27:32.549 how would people die in car accidents 00:27:32.549 --> 00:27:33.549 in the United States every year? 00:27:33.689 --> 00:27:33.989 Does anybody know? 00:27:34.989 --> 00:27:36.069 True pursuit question. 00:27:36.529 --> 00:27:39.989 Usually about 35,000 plus or minus 5,000 individuals. 00:27:39.989 --> 00:27:42.889 Last year was 32,978, approximately. 00:27:42.889 --> 00:27:50.289 So basically I asked him, so what happens if we had 35,000 people dying 00:27:50.278 --> 00:27:54.698 in an airplane accident, in airplanes every year in the United States. 00:27:55.258 --> 00:27:57.138 And a guy looked at me in horror and said, 00:27:57.778 --> 00:28:00.118 Professor, that's a serious question. 00:28:00.298 --> 00:28:02.258 I said, well, I'm just hypothesizing. 00:28:02.338 --> 00:28:03.038 So we academics do. 00:28:03.078 --> 00:28:03.918 We hypothesize. 00:28:04.158 --> 00:28:05.138 What do you think would happen? 00:28:05.918 --> 00:28:07.618 So that professor, you know what would happen. 00:28:07.718 --> 00:28:09.298 So I'm just asking, please tell me. 00:28:09.798 --> 00:28:12.478 We would close down airspace. 00:28:13.198 --> 00:28:19.678 So I said basically, so you are accepting 35,000 people dead on the roads. 00:28:19.678 --> 00:28:24.458 but you aren't accepting 35,000 people dead in airplanes. 00:28:24.698 --> 00:28:25.358 That's right. 00:28:25.798 --> 00:28:28.218 And a lot of the main reasons for that is the media. 00:28:28.578 --> 00:28:30.578 The media basically frighten people from flying, 00:28:30.938 --> 00:28:33.378 but road accidents happen all the time so we can accept those deaths. 00:28:33.798 --> 00:28:35.358 It's something to think about, isn't it? 00:28:36.478 --> 00:28:37.958 What's interesting, by the way, on that point, 00:28:38.118 --> 00:28:41.118 I usually get this question, so obviously I'll answer it before you give it to me. 00:28:41.618 --> 00:28:45.058 So it's basically, are airplanes always safer than cars? 00:28:45.058 --> 00:28:48.938 and on a 24-hour, seven-day cycle, 00:28:49.318 --> 00:28:50.678 there's only one period 00:28:50.678 --> 00:28:52.758 where cars are safer than airplanes. 00:28:53.138 --> 00:28:56.098 That's Sunday morning between 7 and 9 a.m. 00:28:56.418 --> 00:28:57.418 when the women are driving, 00:28:57.598 --> 00:28:59.018 or men, women or men are driving to church. 00:28:59.258 --> 00:29:01.098 Rest of the 24, seven-day cycle, 00:29:01.798 --> 00:29:02.658 airplanes are safer. 00:29:03.378 --> 00:29:04.998 The second question I usually get asked, 00:29:04.998 --> 00:29:05.998 so the professor, 00:29:06.158 --> 00:29:08.858 in terms of when are cars most dangerous, 00:29:09.238 --> 00:29:10.398 two periods. 00:29:10.858 --> 00:29:13.438 It's basically Friday nights and Saturday nights 00:29:13.438 --> 00:29:18.198 between midnight and four in the morning, when people come back drunk or to have too much 00:29:18.188 --> 00:29:20.408 drugs or whatever they've been doing, or lack of sleep. 00:29:22.068 --> 00:29:26.328 Furthermore, another final factor here is how you show female vis-a-vis male. 00:29:27.428 --> 00:29:30.908 Women are much more worried about risks than men. 00:29:31.648 --> 00:29:33.348 And there are two explanations for that. 00:29:33.648 --> 00:29:37.228 One is the very vulgar Stone Age explanation, which I do not buy into, by the way, 00:29:37.268 --> 00:29:40.208 but I'll give it to you anyways, is basically women are basically home nurturing 00:29:40.208 --> 00:29:41.888 and men are out hunter-gathering. 00:29:42.028 --> 00:29:43.668 It's very simplistic, I don't buy into it. 00:29:44.208 --> 00:29:47.968 But more seriously, research by Professor Jen Lerner at Harvard 00:29:47.968 --> 00:29:52.488 shows that women, overall, are much more emotional than men, 00:29:52.488 --> 00:29:57.308 and there's a clear connection between emotion and risk aversion. 00:29:59.148 --> 00:30:05.488 So when these variables were basically introduced in the 1960s and 70s up to the early 80s, 00:30:06.308 --> 00:30:11.748 regulators and industry took the view that one should develop risk communication programs. 00:30:11.988 --> 00:30:15.868 They were saying, wow, what a fascinating interesting work 00:30:15.868 --> 00:30:16.928 and all these psychologists, 00:30:17.528 --> 00:30:19.188 been primarily active in the United States, by the way, 00:30:19.508 --> 00:30:20.988 putting forward all these recommendations, 00:30:21.388 --> 00:30:24.068 we can now develop communication programs 00:30:24.068 --> 00:30:27.948 where we can convince the publics of Europe and North America 00:30:27.948 --> 00:30:30.308 on how to build nuclear power plants 00:30:30.308 --> 00:30:32.908 and how to site nuclear waste facilities, 00:30:33.628 --> 00:30:37.528 and basically convince publics that certain foods are safe. 00:30:37.768 --> 00:30:38.308 This is great. 00:30:38.448 --> 00:30:41.188 We now know why you guys think this risk is higher than anyone, 00:30:41.328 --> 00:30:42.428 because of the involuntary risk, 00:30:42.488 --> 00:30:43.588 it's an unfamiliar risk, 00:30:43.648 --> 00:30:45.628 or it's non-controllable, and the like. 00:30:45.868 --> 00:31:15.848 Thank you. 00:30:46.097 --> 00:30:50.137 So they put forward three types of communication strategies, 00:30:50.737 --> 00:30:54.077 that of top-down, dialogue, or bottom-up. 00:30:54.777 --> 00:30:56.197 The first one is top-down. 00:30:56.537 --> 00:30:58.717 It's basically that is I stand on a podium. 00:30:59.117 --> 00:31:02.557 I'm trying to convince you to build basically a fourth or third 00:31:02.557 --> 00:31:03.897 or a fourth runway at Heathrow. 00:31:04.257 --> 00:31:06.617 And I'm saying basically the reason why we should have this runway 00:31:06.617 --> 00:31:07.537 at Heathrow is this. 00:31:07.737 --> 00:31:10.837 And I know it's involuntary for you and it's unfamiliar for you, 00:31:10.837 --> 00:31:13.277 but I want to persuade you anyways. 00:31:14.057 --> 00:31:18.517 Top-down risk communication strategies usually don't work. 00:31:19.277 --> 00:31:21.897 The second form of strategy is so-called dialogue strategy. 00:31:22.417 --> 00:31:24.577 Rather than being basically up here on a podium, 00:31:25.117 --> 00:31:26.717 I'll basically be sitting basically in the audience. 00:31:27.097 --> 00:31:29.297 Clarify, these will be available, these PowerPoint slides, right? 00:31:29.337 --> 00:31:31.217 So you don't have to copy all the slides if you don't want to. 00:31:31.857 --> 00:31:35.077 So what happens here, basically, I'll be in the audience with you, 00:31:35.077 --> 00:31:36.797 so I'm going to be sitting down and saying, basically, 00:31:36.917 --> 00:31:38.897 let's build this waste incinerator. 00:31:39.037 --> 00:31:40.857 So I'm not going to leave the camera. 00:31:40.977 --> 00:31:41.897 I walk down here. 00:31:41.957 --> 00:31:42.817 I'm going to sit down there with you. 00:31:42.817 --> 00:31:44.417 right in front seat here. 00:31:44.817 --> 00:31:46.017 Let's do this waste incinerator. 00:31:46.157 --> 00:31:47.857 I know you don't really like it, 00:31:48.077 --> 00:31:49.677 but how about we make some kind of compromise? 00:31:50.197 --> 00:31:51.277 Let's find a deal. 00:31:51.737 --> 00:31:54.277 So how about if I move your ancestral burial ground 00:31:54.277 --> 00:31:56.177 from place A to place D? 00:31:56.617 --> 00:31:58.637 Will you then buy into a waste incinerator? 00:31:59.017 --> 00:32:01.537 Or possibly, if I basically add some little playground 00:32:01.537 --> 00:32:03.337 for your kids in the back over there, 00:32:03.717 --> 00:32:06.157 nicely landscaping your fresh grass and the like. 00:32:06.577 --> 00:32:07.857 Can we find some solution? 00:32:09.337 --> 00:32:12.017 Dialogue, risk communication can work 00:32:12.017 --> 00:32:13.997 If you A, trust you. 00:32:14.006 --> 00:32:19.606 me. B, basically feel that all these gifts are not bribes, but they are basically more than not 00:32:19.606 --> 00:32:23.386 bribes, but some more serious that you are actually really concerned about my ancestors. 00:32:24.066 --> 00:32:30.246 And C, that I feel empowered to tell you if I don't like this, you can get lost. So dialogue 00:32:30.246 --> 00:32:37.766 can work. The third example of risk communication is so-called bottom-up risk communication. What 00:32:37.766 --> 00:32:43.386 happens here is something starts at a local level and then moves up to a national level, 00:32:43.386 --> 00:32:45.446 and then it goes international. 00:32:46.106 --> 00:32:49.426 And a classic point is the Greenpeace's occupation 00:32:49.426 --> 00:32:52.786 of the Brennenspar oil storage buoy in the 1990s, as you know, 00:32:53.266 --> 00:32:56.246 in the North Sea, where this issue became very much 00:32:56.246 --> 00:32:59.406 firstly a local issue, but very quickly scaled up 00:32:59.406 --> 00:33:01.886 to international issue because Greenpeace very smartly 00:33:01.886 --> 00:33:06.266 put on this vessel campaigners who were fluent 00:33:06.266 --> 00:33:10.186 in German, Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, as well as English. 00:33:10.466 --> 00:33:12.566 So they could get multiple news outlets and became 00:33:12.566 --> 00:33:18.386 very much of an international European issue. 00:33:18.386 --> 00:33:23.166 So you figured risk communication is still very difficult to do. 00:33:23.166 --> 00:33:25.006 And there are a number of reasons for that. 00:33:25.006 --> 00:33:27.686 And what happened was is that the individuals who 00:33:27.686 --> 00:33:29.786 are trying to build waste incinerators and nuclear power 00:33:29.786 --> 00:33:33.026 plants, and once again I should clarify that historically up 00:33:33.026 --> 00:33:35.806 in the past 15 years, is that something 00:33:35.806 --> 00:33:38.566 like 90% of all research on this topic 00:33:38.566 --> 00:33:40.186 has been done in the United States. 00:33:40.186 --> 00:33:41.926 This is not changing over time. 00:33:41.916 --> 00:33:45.876 So what happened was they said, we can still build this nuclear power plant. 00:33:45.996 --> 00:33:50.536 We have all the tools you have given us, and we still can't build them. 00:33:50.776 --> 00:33:52.476 And people still don't love us, you know. 00:33:52.496 --> 00:33:53.636 It's a horrible thing, you know. 00:33:53.856 --> 00:33:56.196 Can you please find out why people don't love us? 00:33:56.216 --> 00:33:57.016 What's going on? 00:33:57.056 --> 00:33:57.836 Have we failed? 00:33:58.576 --> 00:34:01.316 So we all sat down and we got back involved with this 00:34:01.316 --> 00:34:04.596 and identified a number of key variables. 00:34:05.776 --> 00:34:09.756 First point is the whole issue of the social amplification 00:34:09.756 --> 00:34:13.356 and the social attenuation of risk. 00:34:14.056 --> 00:34:16.076 Some risks are socially amplified 00:34:16.076 --> 00:34:19.916 and some risks are socially attenuated. 00:34:20.176 --> 00:34:21.416 Exact opposite to amplification. 00:34:21.936 --> 00:34:22.916 If I mentioned, for example, 00:34:23.416 --> 00:34:26.256 airplane accidents are highly amplified 00:34:26.256 --> 00:34:28.996 by the media and by social networks 00:34:28.996 --> 00:34:30.296 and by all of us. 00:34:30.976 --> 00:34:32.596 Other risks are attenuated. 00:34:32.596 --> 00:34:37.496 For example, in the U.S., suicides are attenuated. 00:34:37.956 --> 00:34:39.816 In the U.S., you have basically a deal. 00:34:39.916 --> 00:34:40.736 The media has a deal. 00:34:41.316 --> 00:34:43.456 They do not report on suicides. 00:34:44.376 --> 00:34:49.696 And the reason for that is they're worried about so-called copycat suicides. 00:34:50.216 --> 00:34:52.396 The most favorite place to kill yourself in the United States is where? 00:34:52.536 --> 00:34:52.876 Does anybody know? 00:34:54.376 --> 00:34:55.216 Very good. 00:34:55.296 --> 00:34:56.396 You guys are on the ball. 00:34:56.736 --> 00:34:57.916 And what is late in the day? 00:34:58.076 --> 00:34:59.756 Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco. 00:35:00.236 --> 00:35:02.716 So basically, people are killing themselves all the time over there. 00:35:02.776 --> 00:35:05.416 And what happens basically, if you had a San Francisco Chronicle, 00:35:05.416 --> 00:35:09.836 all have an article about Joe Bloggs jumps off bridge, Golden Gate Bridge. 00:35:09.825 --> 00:35:14.865 on day two you have four Joe blogs and then week and then day seven you have 20 00:35:14.865 --> 00:35:18.525 and then the month later we have 50 a group jump off the Golden Gate Bridge we 00:35:18.525 --> 00:35:24.165 don't really want that do we so we tend to attenuate suicides and on that note 00:35:24.165 --> 00:35:28.185 can you please tell your journalist friends in this country that they should 00:35:28.185 --> 00:35:33.945 please please please also attenuate suicides the reason why I say say that 00:35:33.945 --> 00:35:37.325 and I should clarify my personal interest I have I'm married up to teenage 00:35:37.325 --> 00:35:41.385 daughters. This is something that worries me a lot. I don't remember we had in South 00:35:41.385 --> 00:35:46.925 Wales a few years ago. It wasn't absolutely horrific. The media was 00:35:46.925 --> 00:35:50.705 partially responsible for those girls deaths. You had basically teenage girls 00:35:50.705 --> 00:35:55.925 in South Wales hanging themselves in their bedrooms. That should not have been 00:35:55.925 --> 00:36:00.705 reported. By reporting it, people are saying, okay fine, it's not my 00:36:00.705 --> 00:36:09.065 do it myself. We do not want suicides amplified. We want suicides attenuated. Please, please, please. 00:36:09.705 --> 00:36:15.785 And the same thing goes, in my view, in terms of, you know, multiple murders in schools where kids 00:36:15.785 --> 00:36:18.845 come in with machine guns and guns and kill everybody, you know, Columbine, for example. 00:36:19.445 --> 00:36:26.085 These issues should also not be amplified. We should attenuate them as much as possible because 00:36:26.085 --> 00:36:32.425 by amplifying that gives kids, other kids ideas. That explains partially, for example, 00:36:32.425 --> 00:36:37.745 why we had now a couple of mass murders in schools in Finland. Why? Because they've been 00:36:37.735 --> 00:36:39.715 but in media. This is very worrying. 00:36:40.055 --> 00:36:41.755 It's something I do hope. Please tell 00:36:41.755 --> 00:36:43.715 your journalist friends, don't amplify suicides. 00:36:44.695 --> 00:36:45.795 Another issue 00:36:45.795 --> 00:36:47.555 is attenuated. It's so-called basically taboo 00:36:47.555 --> 00:36:49.575 risks. Depression is basically 00:36:49.575 --> 00:36:51.715 something that is attenuated. 00:36:51.795 --> 00:36:53.555 You don't discuss depression. Depression 00:36:53.555 --> 00:36:54.695 seems not to be normal. 00:36:55.495 --> 00:36:57.575 And furthermore, sexually 00:36:57.575 --> 00:36:59.555 transmitted diseases are 00:36:59.555 --> 00:37:00.875 also attenuated. 00:37:01.515 --> 00:37:03.695 For example, if I had 00:37:03.695 --> 00:37:05.775 gonorrhea, would I tell you about it? 00:37:06.495 --> 00:37:06.755 Would I? 00:37:07.735 --> 00:37:11.395 No, no, no, of course not. 00:37:12.195 --> 00:37:14.675 And the reason for, I don't buy it, I don't have a gunnery, trust me. 00:37:16.835 --> 00:37:19.175 So, of course not. 00:37:19.575 --> 00:37:22.315 Why would I not tell you about if I had gonorrhea or not? 00:37:22.315 --> 00:37:29.355 Because if I had it and I told you, my credibility in your eyes would go down the toilet, wouldn't it? 00:37:29.895 --> 00:37:32.735 But I already told you, I'm happily married, I have two daughters who live in Wimbledon. 00:37:32.995 --> 00:37:35.415 So you think, why in the earth did he get gonorrhea for me? 00:37:35.455 --> 00:37:36.875 Where's this man been? 00:37:36.875 --> 00:37:38.675 somewhere in Amsterdam or something? 00:37:38.675 --> 00:37:40.475 What an idiot, you know? 00:37:40.475 --> 00:37:42.335 He should be, he's hanging with prostitutes? 00:37:42.335 --> 00:37:44.375 What the guy, what's he doing? 00:37:44.375 --> 00:37:45.835 This is not normal. 00:37:45.835 --> 00:37:47.995 You would think much less of me. 00:37:47.995 --> 00:37:50.635 That said, what I try to tell my students at King's College, 00:37:50.635 --> 00:37:53.675 I don't know how it is, these appear in this part of the world, 00:37:53.675 --> 00:37:57.695 is I want to have kids to be aware of STDs 00:37:57.695 --> 00:37:59.675 and also go and have them self-checked. 00:37:59.675 --> 00:38:02.415 Because it's very clear, particularly chlamydia 00:38:02.415 --> 00:38:05.655 at universities in this country is on the rise, and it's something 00:38:05.644 --> 00:38:07.024 that we should actually amplify. 00:38:07.464 --> 00:38:08.444 We should actually tell you, Jonas, 00:38:08.604 --> 00:38:10.004 don't amplify suicides. 00:38:10.144 --> 00:38:11.004 Amplify chlamydia. 00:38:11.584 --> 00:38:12.764 So people get worried about chlamydia 00:38:12.764 --> 00:38:14.284 and get themselves checked out, please. 00:38:15.764 --> 00:38:17.204 So one of the crucial importance 00:38:17.204 --> 00:38:19.124 was the issue of social amplification 00:38:19.124 --> 00:38:20.944 as well as tenuation of risk. 00:38:21.744 --> 00:38:23.344 Another variable that came up 00:38:23.344 --> 00:38:24.324 was the whole issue 00:38:24.324 --> 00:38:27.324 of the so-called narrative approach. 00:38:28.084 --> 00:38:29.924 One of the main factors 00:38:29.924 --> 00:38:33.244 why risk communication has failed 00:38:33.244 --> 00:38:35.744 is now by the early 1990s, 00:38:36.244 --> 00:38:39.844 is that people communicated in numbers. 00:38:40.704 --> 00:38:43.364 People don't understand numbers. 00:38:44.224 --> 00:38:47.544 50% of Americans cannot tip in restaurants. 00:38:47.544 --> 00:38:49.184 They don't understand tipping. 00:38:49.304 --> 00:38:49.764 They don't understand, you know, 00:38:49.964 --> 00:38:52.504 if I want to leave 10%, how much money is that on a tip? 00:38:52.584 --> 00:38:54.724 And even if you go to New York, you have to tip. 00:38:54.784 --> 00:38:56.004 Otherwise, you get shot, more or less. 00:38:57.484 --> 00:39:02.064 Furthermore, 25% of university-educated Americans 00:39:02.064 --> 00:39:06.924 did not know the difference between 1%, 5%, or 10% in terms of risk. 00:39:06.964 --> 00:39:08.244 What's higher, what's lower. 00:39:08.764 --> 00:39:11.424 People do not like numbers. 00:39:12.204 --> 00:39:17.204 So one of the main failures of risk communication prior to the 1990s 00:39:17.204 --> 00:39:18.704 was people were communicating in numbers. 00:39:18.924 --> 00:39:20.604 They were saying, this risk is small. 00:39:20.684 --> 00:39:24.324 It's like 10 to the minus 4, 10 to the minus 5, or 10 to the minus 9. 00:39:24.684 --> 00:39:27.444 People did it no difference between 10 to the minus 4, 5, and 9. 00:39:27.824 --> 00:39:29.664 That was a crucial failure. 00:39:29.664 --> 00:39:33.564 But we found in the risk community in the 90s and 00:39:33.553 --> 00:39:35.453 just the past 15 years or so, 00:39:35.993 --> 00:39:38.313 was that the best way actually of phrasing 00:39:38.313 --> 00:39:40.173 risk communication messages 00:39:40.173 --> 00:39:43.733 is via narratives and anecdotes. 00:39:44.113 --> 00:39:46.193 Stories. People like stories. 00:39:46.713 --> 00:39:49.873 I'm convinced that after you had a glass of wine tonight, 00:39:49.973 --> 00:39:51.693 you'll remember two things from my talk today. 00:39:52.173 --> 00:39:54.193 That is basically the professor breaking his leg 00:39:54.193 --> 00:39:55.473 in four places in Zermatt, 00:39:55.753 --> 00:39:57.513 and my daughter and the bird poo example. 00:39:57.693 --> 00:39:58.053 Am I right? 00:39:58.513 --> 00:39:58.993 Yeah. 00:39:59.253 --> 00:40:02.033 Because those are anecdotal personal stories, 00:40:02.113 --> 00:40:03.253 and they're both true, by the way. 00:40:03.253 --> 00:40:04.113 and people ask me, 00:40:04.433 --> 00:40:04.933 are you really, 00:40:05.053 --> 00:40:05.933 does that really happen to you? 00:40:05.933 --> 00:40:06.453 I can show you. 00:40:06.493 --> 00:40:07.133 If you want to, 00:40:07.353 --> 00:40:08.053 I can show you my, 00:40:08.133 --> 00:40:09.753 I still have bolts in my right leg, 00:40:09.813 --> 00:40:10.133 by the way. 00:40:10.433 --> 00:40:11.213 And the story of my daughter 00:40:11.213 --> 00:40:12.513 is absolutely positively true too. 00:40:12.713 --> 00:40:13.353 Believe me on that. 00:40:13.693 --> 00:40:14.753 It's people like stories. 00:40:15.193 --> 00:40:15.953 The problem is, 00:40:15.973 --> 00:40:17.253 and I always give this talk to regulators, 00:40:17.413 --> 00:40:21.033 is that when you go into narratives 00:40:21.033 --> 00:40:22.253 and you go into stories, 00:40:22.793 --> 00:40:25.753 please compare like with like. 00:40:26.353 --> 00:40:27.433 Apples with apples 00:40:27.433 --> 00:40:28.853 and oranges and oranges 00:40:28.853 --> 00:40:30.233 and not apples and oranges. 00:40:30.233 --> 00:40:33.093 I find this profoundly irritating. 00:40:33.253 --> 00:40:34.753 When people don't do that. 00:40:34.753 --> 00:40:40.493 And for example, one typical example, oh basically it's like being walking around in a thunderstorm 00:40:40.493 --> 00:40:41.493 and being hit by lightning. 00:40:41.493 --> 00:40:42.753 The risk is really small. 00:40:42.753 --> 00:40:43.753 You heard it before? 00:40:43.753 --> 00:40:44.753 Yes. 00:40:44.753 --> 00:40:45.753 Okay. 00:40:45.753 --> 00:40:50.373 Well, my friends, it really depends where you are in a thunderstorm, doesn't it? 00:40:50.373 --> 00:40:54.913 So for example, if you are here in Downing College, Cambridge, now in a thunderstorm, 00:40:54.913 --> 00:40:55.913 you know what? 00:40:55.913 --> 00:40:56.913 We are perfectly safe here. 00:40:56.913 --> 00:40:59.493 We're not going to be struck by lightning, I can guarantee you, right? 00:40:59.493 --> 00:41:01.473 Yes, thank you very much. 00:41:01.463 --> 00:41:09.103 However, if you are basically fishing in a small little rowboat in a South Swedish lake with your two daughters, 00:41:09.603 --> 00:41:13.203 and all of a sudden you have a lightning storm, a thunderstorm hitting you, 00:41:13.543 --> 00:41:16.083 you know what, the chances of being hit by lightning is pretty high. 00:41:16.923 --> 00:41:18.403 And that's what happened to me last summer. 00:41:18.603 --> 00:41:20.203 And that was a horrifying experience. 00:41:20.923 --> 00:41:24.123 I had never rowed so fast in my entire life. 00:41:24.423 --> 00:41:26.223 I was going, please don't die. 00:41:26.363 --> 00:41:27.123 Let's just make it. 00:41:27.183 --> 00:41:27.703 Let's make it. 00:41:27.703 --> 00:41:30.083 And the thunder was almost just, you know, is he counting? 00:41:30.303 --> 00:41:31.463 Boom, it's here, it's here. 00:41:31.803 --> 00:41:32.683 It was a horrible thing. 00:41:32.763 --> 00:41:35.363 And I asked, I gave a talk actually a couple months ago 00:41:35.363 --> 00:41:37.743 to U.S. Coast Guard, as you do, 00:41:38.143 --> 00:41:39.263 and I asked them basically, 00:41:39.523 --> 00:41:41.783 so what should I have done 00:41:41.783 --> 00:41:44.183 when you are in a boat in a thunderstorm like that? 00:41:44.583 --> 00:41:46.803 Well, Professor, you were more or less toast. 00:41:46.803 --> 00:41:48.343 If that lightning were to hit you. 00:41:49.723 --> 00:41:52.023 I said, thank you very much. 00:41:52.083 --> 00:41:52.723 That wasn't very helpful. 00:41:52.883 --> 00:41:53.603 You were toast. 00:41:53.723 --> 00:41:56.503 You don't go out in thunderstorms fishing in a rowboat. 00:41:56.623 --> 00:41:57.303 That was stupid. 00:41:58.063 --> 00:41:59.063 You know how Coast Guard, 00:41:59.063 --> 00:42:01.003 These military folks can be quite direct, actually. 00:42:01.223 --> 00:42:04.043 So keep that in mind. 00:42:04.123 --> 00:42:05.483 Don't go out fishing in thunderstorms. 00:42:06.203 --> 00:42:07.303 So compare life with flight. 00:42:07.383 --> 00:42:11.483 Another example is basically living next to a nuclear power station 00:42:11.483 --> 00:42:15.203 is like smoking one cigarette in your lifetime. 00:42:15.823 --> 00:42:16.883 That's a horrible example. 00:42:17.023 --> 00:42:17.223 Why? 00:42:17.323 --> 00:42:20.583 Because living next to a nuclear power station is an example of what? 00:42:20.583 --> 00:42:24.323 Of an involuntary risk, which we discussed before. 00:42:24.663 --> 00:42:26.203 People are 1,000 times more worried about. 00:42:26.603 --> 00:42:27.923 Smoking a cigarette is what? 00:42:27.923 --> 00:42:29.363 A voluntary risk. 00:42:29.372 --> 00:42:31.232 that's not like with like. 00:42:31.352 --> 00:42:33.012 So if you're going to go for anecdotes now 00:42:33.012 --> 00:42:36.212 with your students and teachers and so on and so forth, 00:42:36.312 --> 00:42:37.892 please do apples with apples. 00:42:39.152 --> 00:42:41.292 Another whole issue is the issue of deliberation. 00:42:41.532 --> 00:42:43.552 And I have six more minutes and I'm going to finish up. 00:42:44.272 --> 00:42:46.112 Deliberation is, yeah, one of them slides, eight. 00:42:46.212 --> 00:42:47.532 That's more than last week in Bonham. 00:42:47.632 --> 00:42:48.732 Okay, get one more and we'll stop. 00:42:49.452 --> 00:42:52.592 So the whole importance of deliberation 00:42:52.592 --> 00:42:55.252 is that there's a belief that we should involve the public 00:42:55.252 --> 00:42:57.352 much more in the policy-making process. 00:42:57.852 --> 00:42:58.132 You know what? 00:42:58.332 --> 00:42:59.232 I'm all for that. 00:42:59.372 --> 00:43:05.812 But the problem in doing so, and it's something we have to have the policymakers and regulators work on much harder, 00:43:06.132 --> 00:43:11.292 the problem in doing so is a so-called self-selection process. 00:43:11.952 --> 00:43:19.132 So, for example, a few years ago I did a major study trying to involve a number of Germans in the North Black Forest 00:43:19.132 --> 00:43:21.972 in trying to help site a waste incinerator. 00:43:22.212 --> 00:43:28.452 What we wanted them to do is to participate once a week for two hours from 7 to 9 in the evening on a Wednesday 00:43:28.452 --> 00:43:32.532 for a period of six months to get enough knowledge on the whole siting of the 00:43:32.532 --> 00:43:35.592 waste incinerator issue we go and basically have them come up with the 00:43:35.592 --> 00:43:40.392 decision. And we can pay them basically something like 800 Deutsche Marks, 400 00:43:40.392 --> 00:43:45.372 euros for the process. So of the four and a half thousand letters we sent out to 00:43:45.372 --> 00:43:49.752 random households in North Black Forest, how many of those individuals decide to 00:43:49.752 --> 00:43:57.292 participate? Want to guess? Zero. Anybody else? Five percent. It was 3.5 00:43:57.281 --> 00:43:59.961 was basically around 200 individuals. 00:44:00.401 --> 00:44:03.421 And those 200 individuals had three things in common. 00:44:04.201 --> 00:44:05.761 I'm going to count them up for you. 00:44:05.781 --> 00:44:08.021 Do you think they were for or against incinerator? 00:44:09.101 --> 00:44:09.841 Thank you. 00:44:09.881 --> 00:44:10.601 It's getting good. 00:44:10.881 --> 00:44:12.161 Against incinerator, okay? 00:44:12.721 --> 00:44:15.081 Did they have basically time under hands 00:44:15.081 --> 00:44:16.421 or were they time poor? 00:44:17.401 --> 00:44:19.141 They had time under hands. 00:44:19.461 --> 00:44:21.121 They were basically, they were pensioners. 00:44:21.181 --> 00:44:21.581 Hello, hello. 00:44:21.941 --> 00:44:22.821 They were students. 00:44:22.821 --> 00:44:26.641 They were basically, they were housemen or housewives 00:44:26.641 --> 00:44:27.381 or they were unemployed. 00:44:28.161 --> 00:44:29.241 And a third factor, 00:44:29.781 --> 00:44:32.021 were they more right of spectrum politically 00:44:32.021 --> 00:44:33.721 or more left of spectrum politically? 00:44:35.261 --> 00:44:36.561 They were more left spectrum. 00:44:36.641 --> 00:44:37.661 They were either social democrats 00:44:37.661 --> 00:44:38.601 or they were greens. 00:44:39.261 --> 00:44:40.441 And the state of bottom vertebrate 00:44:40.441 --> 00:44:41.421 until the last election 00:44:41.421 --> 00:44:43.421 was a CDU conservative stronghold 00:44:43.421 --> 00:44:45.101 with low unemployment. 00:44:45.381 --> 00:44:46.541 Something to keep in mind. 00:44:47.201 --> 00:44:48.921 This is something that we need to consider. 00:44:49.161 --> 00:44:50.341 And we're now less than five minutes. 00:44:50.481 --> 00:44:51.801 I won't go through eight slides. 00:44:52.181 --> 00:44:53.341 Another important factor 00:44:53.341 --> 00:44:55.161 is how you should have optimistically bias. 00:44:55.741 --> 00:44:57.801 Work by Neil Weinstein found out, basically, 00:44:58.381 --> 00:45:01.941 that we are, in many cases, very much optimistically biased. 00:45:02.141 --> 00:45:03.861 That is, for example, particularly young. 00:45:04.421 --> 00:45:06.621 That's why people smoke or people drink. 00:45:07.381 --> 00:45:10.481 Smokers, when they start smoking 15, 16, or 17 years of age, 00:45:11.181 --> 00:45:14.861 they think, A, that they're not going to be killed of smoking. 00:45:15.401 --> 00:45:19.201 And, B, they feel they can stop smoking at any time. 00:45:19.501 --> 00:45:20.061 It's not a big deal. 00:45:20.381 --> 00:45:22.481 I'm 17. I have a great body. I'm beautiful. 00:45:22.621 --> 00:45:24.101 I can stop smoking anytime I want to. 00:45:24.101 --> 00:45:25.201 . 00:45:25.191 --> 00:45:27.371 And research shows, of course, basically, 00:45:27.571 --> 00:45:30.871 that most individuals cannot stop smoking once they've started. 00:45:31.471 --> 00:45:34.231 Similar people who are alcoholics and they drink a bottle of whiskey a day, 00:45:34.271 --> 00:45:37.131 whatever they do, they don't think they'll get closer to the liver, do they? 00:45:37.511 --> 00:45:40.931 No, but Joe Bloggs down here in Downing College, Cambridge, 00:45:41.251 --> 00:45:44.751 if this individual has basically a bottle of whiskey and he drinks it, 00:45:44.951 --> 00:45:47.571 he will die from closer to the liver, but not me. 00:45:47.871 --> 00:45:50.131 We are optimistically biased. 00:45:50.131 --> 00:45:55.351 However, with age, we get wiser and we become more aware of the risks. 00:45:55.451 --> 00:45:59.851 For example, now, I'm much more aware of skiing, this risk of skiing than I ever was before. 00:46:00.711 --> 00:46:07.091 And furthermore, if people feel good about an activity, they see the risk as relatively low. 00:46:07.751 --> 00:46:11.671 And likewise, if people feel bad about activity, they see the risks are relatively high. 00:46:12.411 --> 00:46:14.911 And a final factor is the importance of trust. 00:46:15.871 --> 00:46:21.311 Trust can explain up to how 50% of how the public perceive risks. 00:46:21.911 --> 00:46:25.151 So, for example, if you trust a risk imposer, 00:46:25.811 --> 00:46:28.951 if you believe the individual is in the right place morally, 00:46:29.091 --> 00:46:31.851 he seems to be very sympathetic, and I can buy into what he's saying, 00:46:32.351 --> 00:46:37.451 you're willing to accept a much higher risk from that risk imposer 00:46:37.451 --> 00:46:41.791 than if you thought the risk imposer was a complete and utter liar. 00:46:42.191 --> 00:46:43.351 It happens again and again. 00:46:43.351 --> 00:46:47.111 And that's one of the problems, for example, for industry in many parts of Europe and North 00:46:47.111 --> 00:46:49.891 America is the public simply don't believe what they're doing. 00:46:49.891 --> 00:46:53.111 And as a result, they're willing to accept a very, very little. 00:46:53.100 --> 00:46:59.340 risk. So, and now we have two minutes. So basically, now I'm going to discuss, those are the variables 00:46:59.340 --> 00:47:03.560 of risk perception communication. Now I'm going to discuss basically some of the next steps. What 00:47:03.560 --> 00:47:08.740 should happen next from the Ragnar perspective? And something I've been thinking about for quite a 00:47:08.740 --> 00:47:15.220 while now since I've been advising government. Firstly, in my view, we need to introduce a 00:47:15.220 --> 00:47:21.760 broader discussion on risk. I feel it should be both at the school level as also on the government 00:47:21.760 --> 00:47:28.760 level. I have been living in this country since 1993. How many talks have I given at schools, 00:47:28.860 --> 00:47:34.580 you think, since I come to this country? Two. One in 1997 to a Catholic school girl somewhere 00:47:34.580 --> 00:47:39.580 in South London, and just a few months ago to my daughter's school. Two of them. I think 00:47:39.580 --> 00:47:44.620 basically that the schools of this country should use us, risk professors, much more 00:47:44.620 --> 00:47:49.980 so, and have us, not saying that every single week, I'm not giving any ideas now, maybe 00:47:49.980 --> 00:47:55.100 once a year to discuss the importance of risk perception and communication at schools at 00:47:55.100 --> 00:47:59.220 some kind of lunch seminar. I think that would be a very good thing to do. Furthermore, I 00:47:59.220 --> 00:48:03.900 feel we should have a much broader discussion of risk also at a government level. And at 00:48:03.900 --> 00:48:09.080 that point, I can tell you there is a meeting across Whitehall Meeting on Risk next November 00:48:09.080 --> 00:48:13.980 that will be led by the chief scientist, John Bennington. We also need a more sophisticated 00:48:13.980 --> 00:48:17.900 discussion about risk in the media. I mentioned the Daily Mail effect, how much I hate that. 00:48:17.900 --> 00:48:21.020 And I think maybe some form of media guidelines are needed 00:48:21.010 --> 00:48:24.610 a lot of the BBC that came out in 2003. 00:48:25.490 --> 00:48:27.610 We should have a more broader discussion 00:48:27.610 --> 00:48:29.910 on risk-based policymaking on the EU level. 00:48:30.430 --> 00:48:32.350 On that note, I can tell you the European Parliament 00:48:32.350 --> 00:48:34.570 under Julie Gerling, Conservative MEP, 00:48:35.030 --> 00:48:37.910 is setting up a working group on risk going forward right now. 00:48:38.210 --> 00:48:39.790 We met, actually, last month. 00:48:40.810 --> 00:48:44.310 We need also to ensure that we discussed in the last panel 00:48:44.310 --> 00:48:45.210 the issue of transparency. 00:48:45.350 --> 00:48:47.090 I heard that word a lot, actually, in the last panel. 00:48:47.630 --> 00:48:49.350 And transparency is here to stay. 00:48:49.350 --> 00:48:53.370 We have more and more transparency now thanks to internet and social media and the like. 00:48:53.950 --> 00:48:56.110 But in my view, I don't know how it is in the school system, 00:48:56.250 --> 00:49:00.750 but I think many stakeholders are simply not ready for it. 00:49:01.210 --> 00:49:02.310 This is dangerous. 00:49:02.610 --> 00:49:05.290 When stakeholders are not ready for it, what's going to happen, 00:49:05.410 --> 00:49:08.370 then that will lead to greater distrust. 00:49:08.930 --> 00:49:10.990 Transparency, my friends, is like toothpaste. 00:49:12.070 --> 00:49:14.910 Basically, when it's without a tube, you won't put it back in again. 00:49:15.070 --> 00:49:15.890 Then you're going to be stuffed. 00:49:16.750 --> 00:49:19.010 And finally, and of course as a plea, 00:49:19.450 --> 00:49:21.990 we need more funding for higher education 00:49:21.990 --> 00:49:23.790 in the area of risk-based policymaking. 00:49:23.910 --> 00:49:25.190 I should clarify I'm biased here. 00:49:25.590 --> 00:49:26.510 I think this sounds... 00:49:26.510 --> 00:49:28.450 I admit that. 00:49:28.690 --> 00:49:31.010 But I think this is an important area 00:49:31.010 --> 00:49:33.290 and it's something we can do much more in the future. 00:49:33.550 --> 00:49:35.090 That note, I say thank you very much for your attention. 00:49:35.090 --> 00:49:35.210 Thank you. 00:49:45.890 --> 00:49:47.990 Bye.